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The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of competition, both internal and 
external, and of the business cycle on monopolistic markups in the Polish economy. 
The results show that there are significant markups in several sectors of the economy 
which complies with earlier estimations by the authors. According to the estimations 
carried out, competition has a significant impact on the level of markups. This result 
applies both to internal competition, measured by market concentration, and foreign 
competition, measured by import penetration ratios. In addition, there was a 
significant negative correlation between markups and the macroeconomic cycle 
which seems to confirm the conclusions from numerous theoretical macro and 
microeconomic models.  The results also point to a positive but less clear correlation 
between the sectoral cycle and the level of markups.  A different reaction of markups 
to the sectoral and macroeconomic cycles may result from a different nature of 
adjustments of businesses in reaction to exogenous shocks affecting either the 
sectoral or the macroeconomic environment of the enterprises. 
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Introduction 
The aim of the study is to analyse the impact of the level of competition, both internal 
and external, and the impact of the business cycle on monopolistic markups in the 
Polish economy. In order to examine these issues, it is necessary to estimate the 
change of monopolistic markups over time within a given sector.  The applied 
methodology allows for unbiased estimation of variable markups without the 
necessity to use instrumental variables in order to eliminate the impact of 
technological disturbances on the results of the estimation. Using the sectoral time-
varying estimates, authors carried out a panel regression of markups on internal and 
external competition measures. Behaviour of markups over the business cycle is an 
issue which was analysed additionally using panel methods. A simple correlation 
analysis of relations between the markups and the business cycle at the level of 
branches and at the macroeconomic level was also performed.  
Section one contains a short review of literature related to the estimation of 
monopolistic markups and theoretical and empirical studies, describing the impact of 
competition and the business cycle on monopolistic markups.  Section two provides 
the theoretical basis for the empirical model. The subsequent section describes the 
statistical data and the results of the estimation of monopolistic markups. It contains 
the results of the analysis of the impact of competition on margins and the behaviour 
of markups during the business cycle. Last section is followed by a short summary.  
1. Review of literature 
The majority of economic literature concerning the price-cost margins relies directly 
or indirectly on the methodology developed by Hall (1988) who estimates 
monopolistic markups in the American economy using aggregated sectoral data with 
the assumption of constant returns to scale1. If there are two production factors 
(labour and capital), the empirical specification of Hall boils down to the equation 
where the dependent variable is a change in the logarithm of the volume of 
production per unit of capital and independent variable is a change in the logarithm 
of employment per unit of capital, multiplied by the labour share in the total 
                                                   
1 Klette (1999) proposes the method of simultaneous estimation of markups and scale elasticity using the unit data without 
assuming constant returns to scale. This method is also based on the study by Hall. It was the basis for the estimation of long-
run markups and scale elasticity in the Polish economy in the study by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006). 
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production cost.  The estimated slope coefficient is equivalent to the monopolistic 
markup (expressed as a percentage of marginal cost). The theoretical grounds for the 
equation estimated by Hall are presented in the second part of this study.  
There is a problem of endogeneity since there is a correlation between the error term 
(which is a function of productivity) and the dependent variables.  Identification of 
the markup is based on the use of instrumental variables which influence the changes 
in employment and demand and at the same time they do not affect productivity. The 
use of demand-related instrumental variables is necessary to separate the supply-
related fluctuations of the economy affecting the unobserved productivity term. 
However, identification of appropriate instrumental variables is problematic. Hall 
uses such measures as the level of government military spending, world price of oil 
and a variable that indicates that a specific political party is in power.  
Roeger (1995) proposes an alternative methodology of markup estimation. It allows 
for elimination of the unobserved productivity term from the regression equation. 
This solves the problem of endogeneity and proper identification of the markup 
estimator. Estimation based on the difference between Solow residuals calculated 
from the production function (the so-called primal residuals) and the cost function 
(dual residuals) may thus be carried out using ordinary least squares.  
Martins and Scarpetta (1999) estimate markups in the manufacturing sectors of 
selected developed countries using the Roeger’s method. Estimators obtained using 
gross output data (studies mentioned earlier studies rely on value added) are lower 
than in the case of studies by Roeger and Hall.  In addition, using value added 
requires additional correction, since otherwise the estimators are biased upwards 
(Roeger, p. 325). Martins and Scarpetta also show that in the case of increasing 
returns to scale, estimates of Hall and Roeger constitute an upper limit of markups 
that actually occur in the economy.  
Roeger’s (1995) methodology was commonly applied in the studies on  markups in 
European countries, with the use of microeconometric data. It is applied by, among 
others, by Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) in the estimation of markups in the 
European Union firms. A similar methodology is applied by Konings, Van Cayseele 
and Warzynski (2003) in the study on the behaviour of Bulgarian and Romanian 
companies.   
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One natural question that arises is what determines the level of margins in individual 
sectors.  The answer requires not only a cross-section analysis of sectors but also a 
detailed look into the behaviour of markups over time. 
The basic factor influencing markups  is the level of internal competition (number of 
competing companies, industry concentration, etc.) and external competition 
(imports of goods competing with the products of a given sector). The impact of 
internal competition on the level of markups is emphasized in the studies by 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Galí and Zilibotti (1995). Influence of  industry 
concentration (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index) on the long-term 
level of markups was examined by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006) but the authors 
did not find any clear-cut positive correlation (however, there is a significant 
correlation between the economies of scale and the level of concentration which 
suggests that there are high barriers to entry in some sectors). Intersectoral 
heterogeneity of markups may thus result from other factors (level of product 
differentiation, price regulations, etc.) which are not measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index. In addition, changes in concentration over time probably have a 
larger impact on the level of markups in individual sectors than it would result from 
the cross-section comparison. It is obvious that the impact of changes in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index on changes in the level of markups cannot be 
examined when markups are assumed to be constant over time.  
There exists a great deal of literature investigating the impact of external competition 
on the level of the markup of price over marginal cost.  Such research include, among 
others, the study of Lundin (2004) for Sweden, where apart from import competition, 
the product differentiation level was included as a factor affecting the level of 
markups; or the study of Abraham, Konings and Vanormelingen (2006) for Belgium, 
where along with the impact of external factors on prices, the importance of trade 
unions in wage setting was examined.  Moreover, Görg and Warzynski (2003) show a 
significant positive impact of export participation on the level of markups. 
A separate issue is the behaviour of monopolistic markups along different stages of 
the business cycle. Theoretical literature on the subject provides contradictory 
hypotheses. On one hand, Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) who, basing on 
classic literature by Sweezy (1939) and Hall and Hitch (1939), point to the existence 
of price rigidity in sectors with small number of companies operating in a collusive 
environment. This rigidity results from a reluctance to adjust prices as the level of 
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marginal cost changes, in fear of undermining collusive agreements.  Therefore, for 
example, a negative technology shock (which causes an increase of marginal cost) 
results in a reduction of monopolistic markups under fixed prices. This indicates 
procyclicality of markups.  Similar conclusions stem from the Green and Porter 
model (1984). In the Kreps and Scheinkman model (1983) companies quickly reach 
their production capacities during boom period and start competing in quantities 
(Cournot competition) as opposed to the recession period when firms compete in the 
Bertrand fashion due to unused production capacities and the possibility to satisfy 
larger demand share. Thus, firms’ profits increase during the boom period and 
decrease during the recession period.  
On the other hand, Rotemberg and Saloner (1984) build a theoretical model which 
shows that the increase of markups in the case of recession (countercyclicality of 
markups) is possible. If demand is rising,  short-term profits from a price undercut by 
a single firm may be large enough for the company to decide to terminate the 
collusive agreement. In the case of a recession, short-term benefits from competitive 
activities are so low that it is profitable to maintain prices at the level fixed by the 
cartel and realize long-term profits. The theoretical models of Bils (1989) and 
Weitzman (1982) predict similar behaviour of markups. However, existing empirical 
studies do not provide a clear-cut solution to the problem of markups cyclicality 
either. The study by Martins and Scarpetta, carried out for selected OECD countries, 
points to the countercyclicality of markups.  In a study based on OECD data, Boulhol 
(2004) also comes to similar conclusions. Paper by Marchetti (2002), studying the 
cyclicality of markups in the Italian economy, points to clear countercyclicality of 
markups in strongly concentrated sectors.  The study by Small (1997), based on the 
British data, points to procyclicality of markups, both in the manufacturing and in the 
services sector. 
This study uses the Roeger’s methodology (1995) to estimate markups in the Polish 
economy using firm-level data.  The selection of this particular methodology was 
motivated by the fact that with firm-level data it is possible to obtain markups 
estimates at the sectoral level for each year. As a consequence, it is possible to obtain 
sectoral-yearly changes in markups which, in turn, allows to examine the impact of 
external variables on the level of monopolistic markups and the relationship between 
the markup fluctuations and the changes in the business cycle. It should be once 
again mentioned that the methodology is based on the assumption of constant 
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returns to scale. However, if sectoral scale elasticity is constant over time, then the 
bias of estimators which results from the actual occurrence of the effects of scale is 
constant (which results directly from the work of Martins and Scarpetta) and does 
not have an impact on the markup dynamics2.  
 
2. Theoretical model 
Let us assume that a firm produces using technology described by the following 
homogeneous of first degree production function: 
 ,),,...,(),,,...,( 11 EKXXFEKXXY NN =  (1) 
where K  denote firms’ stock of fixed assets and iX ’s denote all remaining production 
inputs employed in the production process and E  measures a Hicks-neutral technical 
progress (total factor productivity). Log differentiation of equation (1) gives: 
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Assuming that input markets behave in a perfectly competitive fashion, prices 
of production factors are equal to the value of their respective marginal product 
corrected by the markup of the producing firm. We assume that the size of the 
markup is the same for all factors and is equal to the markup of price over marginal 
cost (MC). Let r  and iw  denote respectively the prices of capital and other inputs, P – 
the price of final good and µ  - the markup over marginal cost ( MCP /=µ ). We can 
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2 Although, one should bear in mind, that according to the study of sectoral markups conducted in Gradzewicz and Hagemejer 
(2006), there could be a possibility of changes in the elasticities of scale over time in the manufacturing industry. 
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where Kα  and iα  denote the input shares in the total production cost, defined as 
YMCXw iii ⋅= /α for iX  and analogously for K. Cost share of factor iX  in the total 
revenue of the firm is denoted by PYXw iii /=θ . We can then rewrite the cost shares: 
 µθα iiii PY
Xw
MC
P ==  (4), 
and respectively for K. Under perfect competition ii θα = , as 1=µ . Under imperfect 
competition 1>µ . By homogeneity of the production function, the Euler theorem 
states that: 
 1=+∑ K
i
i αα  (5) 
We can define the so-called primal Solow residual (SR), based on the 
production function:3 
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Using (4) and (5), it is easy to show that (details of the derivations are given in the 
Annex A.1): 
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Hall (1988) estimates Lerner indices using an equation similar4 to (8), however, due 
to the possibility of correlation of the unobserved 
E
dE
 variable with the explanatory 
variables, it is necessary to use instrumental variables, the choice of which is rather 
problematic. Roeger (1995), solves this problem by using an estimator based on a 
difference between primal and dual (cost function-based) Solow residuals. 
The cost function corresponding to the production function (1) is of the form: 
                                                   
3 See Solow (1957) and Hall (1988). 
4 To arrive at the equation estimated by Hall in the current notation, one has to transform equation (3) to the following form: 
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where G is homogeneous of first degree. Marginal cost is equal to: 
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Log differentiation of equation (10), after applying the Shephard lemma5 and the 
definition (9) gives: 
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If markup µ  is constant, then the growth rate of price is equal to that of 
marginal cost. Thus, 
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rearranging (details are given in Annex A.2), we obtain the so called dual Solow 
residual (based on the cost function – DSR), as a function of prices, input wages and 
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Subtracting equation (13) from (8) and taking into account the definition of 
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It can be easily seen that both left and the right hand side of the above 
equation contains only observable variables (
E
dE
 was eliminated). We can 
approximate changes in variables in (14) by appropriate log differences and estimate 
it using ordinary least squares without running into the risk of omitted variable bias. 
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3. Statistical data and results of monopolistic 
margins estimation 
3.1 Description of statistical data 
Statistical data used in this research comes from financial reports and balance sheets 
of enterprises and has been gathered by the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS – 
forms F-01 and F-02). The data covers the period of 1996-2004 and was collected on 
the annual basis. The time dimension of the dataset roughly corresponds to one 
business cycle6.The database covers enterprises from manufacturing sector (sections 
C, D and E) and from market services (sections G, H, I and K), employing at least 50 
persons. The total number of observations (in raw data) equals approx. 162 thousand. 
The original database has been cleared of extreme and unreliable observations. 
Observations, for which production, employment, capital or labour costs are not 
positive, have been eliminated. Moreover, the sample has been cleared of enterprises 
with extreme measures of labour or capital productivity (measured with value added 
per employee or per unit of fixed assets respectively). Extreme values are defined as 
those where absolute deviations of logarithm of a given variable from the logarithm of 
its median (determined in a relatively homogeneous branch defined at four-digit PKD 
level) exceeds 3. Trimming procedures have reduced the number of observations by 
approx. 6.7% in total. An unbalanced data panel of firms has been used for markup 
estimations.7 
It has been assumed that production is equal to the revenue from sales, adjusted by a 
change in inventories and by the total of taxes paid by the enterprise that cannot be 
attributed directly to relevant factors’ of production costs8. Material costs cover, 
besides the direct cost of materials, costs of purchase of external services and the 
value of goods and materials purchased for resale (important item in the case of 
                                                   
6 The time dimension of the sample is relatively short but thanks to panel data methods it is possible to formulate 
formal conclusions, however, the ability to make long-run judgments is somewhat limited. 
7 In the context of this study, the procedure balancing the data panel  ensures equal number of degrees of freedom 
for time-variable estimators of monopolistic margins under a separate branch. However, the balancing procedure 
involves a selection effect in the group of analysed enterprises, which may potentially lead to positive bias of the 
obtained markup estimators. Since the positive bias may also result from ignoring the possibility of positive 
returns to scale (see Gradzewicz, Hagemejer, 2006), the authors decided to minimise the potential bias and to use 
an unbalanced dataset. 
8 Taxes include excise, property, transport equipment taxes and non-deductible part of value added tax. 
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enterprises engaged in trade). Labour costs cover, on top of wages and salaries, social 
insurance premiums paid by the employer and other prime costs9. Similarly to Klette 
(1999), this study considers energy costs as a separate production factor input. 
Empirical research (see Hyde and Perloff, 1995) shows that estimators of 
monopolistic markups are sensitive with respect to selection of cost categories, and 
greater disaggregation of these increases the efficiency of estimators. Estimation with 
only labour and capital data may lead to inflated estimators.  
In order to construct a measure of capital costs, authors have used a concept 
introduced to efficiency and productivity analysis by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) 
and extended by e.g. Oulton and Srinivasan (2003). It allows for the calculation of a 
stream of capital services generated by a given stock of capital. According to this 
concept, the stream of capital services is proportional to and may be measured as a 
cost of renting capital for production purposes and presented as follows: 
 ititttit Krk ⋅+−= )( δπ ,  (15) 
where: itk  is the measure of capital services, tr  is the rate of return, tπ  is a value-
added deflator, itδ  is the depreciation rate and itK  is the stock of assets of the firm. 
The rate of return (expected return on capital engaged in an alternative project) has 
been proxied by the interest rate of five-year government bonds. Depreciation rate 
has been determined at the level of an enterprise, as a ratio of the depreciation value 
to the fixed assets in purchasers’ prices, while the fixed assets cover both tangible and 
intangible assets, measured in the middle of the year. 
The analysis of the volatility of monopolistic margins uses data for manufacturing 
aggregated at the sectoral level (two-digit division according to NACE).  Business 
cycle measures have been based on the gross value added of a given sector according 
to the Statistical Yearbooks of Industry (Roczniki Statystyczne Przemysłu) 
published by the GUS. Import penetration in a given section has been defined as a 
ratio of import value to the value of gross output plus the import value and minus the 
export value. The measure of export intensity in a given section was calculated as the 
ratio of export value to the value of gross output. Data on the sectoral output have 
been based on the GUS’ Statistical Yearbooks of Industry. Data on international 
                                                   
9 The remaining costs constitute a heterogeneous category and contain, apart from the costs related to 
employment (e.g. business trip costs, death benefits, accident compensation), other cost categories (e.g. property 
insurance). However, it has been decided that this category of costs is included in labour costs. 
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trade come from10 OECD databases (ITCS). International trade data have been 
converted from six-digit HS classification to two-digit level of NACE classification 
using a translation table prepared by Eurostat. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has been calculated on the four-digit (according 
to NACE) disaggregation level (on the basis of the data from forms F-01 and F-02), 
and then aggregated and brought to the adequate branch definition through 
averaging using production levels of branches as weights. HHI may be treated as an 
index of market competitiveness and its reverse can be interpreted as a number of 
hypothetical symmetric enterprises competing in a given market.  
 
3.2 Results of time-variable monopolistic margins 
estimation 
To estimate time-varying monopolistic markups, a procedure proposed by Roeger 
(1995) and described in chapter 2 of this study has been used. One of the main 
assumptions of this method are constant returns to scale. This means, in the case of 
existence of scale economies, that the estimates relate to the markup over average 
cost instead of marginal cost. This assumption is, however, necessary since no 
method to estimate time-varying markups allowing for variable returns to scale has 
been developed yet. Research carried out by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006) with 
the use of a different method based on Klette (1999) and allowing for simultaneous 
estimation of margins and scale effects, shows that in the case of many sectors of the 
economy, we can observe increasing returns to scale11 (some sectors can be 
characterised by decreasing returns to scale). Occurrence of positive scale effects 
implies potentially negative bias on monopolistic markups estimators obtained in this 
study (see Martins, Scarpetta, 1999). 
Table 1 summarises the results of monopolistic markups estimation for sections D, G, 
H, I and K, as well as for the disaggregated manufacturing sector, estimated on the 
basis of equation (14), where changes in continuous time are approximated in 
                                                   
10 Statistical Yearbooks of Industry, published by GUS, contain information on international trade in manufacturing products 
since 2000. As the period of the analysis covers the years 1996-2004, the authors decided to use OECD databases, which are a 
coherent source of data through the entire analysed period. 
11 For instance, in overall manufacturing industry increasing returns to scale have been estimated at 3%, but in such branches as 
manufacture of textiles, paper, printing, manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, non-metallic mineral products and 
basic metals and fabricated metal products, returns to scale have been estimated at least at 10%.  
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discrete time. It presents the average values of obtained markup estimates12 and their 
standard deviations as measures of monopolistic margin volatility in time. The last 
column of Table 1 contains volatility ratio (relation of standard deviation to the 
mean). More detailed markup estimates, together with disaggregation of sections 
included in market services, are presented in the Annex B. In general, when 
estimating markups, it could be observed that the goodness of fit of the estimated 
model (measured by  2R  coefficient) decreases with the number of firms in a given 
sector. This effect is probably resulting from the assumption that margins are 
constant in a given industry in a given year, which, together with an increase in the 
number of observations and thus heterogeneity, implies a decrease in the fit of the 
model. 
When comparing average margins with estimators of monopolistic markups obtained 
for manufacturing branches by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006), it can be said that 
approximately in half of the cases, estimators obtained using both methodologies are 
similar. In the remaining cases, estimators obtained in this study are higher13. In ten 
manufacturing sections similar margin estimators were obtained, while in nine 
sections higher estimators have been obtained, including such sections as 
manufacture of food products; manufacture of textiles; publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media; manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and 
man-made fibres; manufacture of plastic products; manufacture of non-metallic 
mineral products; manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products; 
manufacture of machinery and equipment; manufacture of electrical and optical 
equipment; and manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments. It is 
difficult to interpret the negative markup estimator for the “other transport 
equipment” sector14. It is worth noting, that in both papers, similar markup estimates 
for the entire manufacturing sector have been obtained, i.e. approximately 9-10%. 
                                                   
12 Margin estimates presented in the table, after multiplication by 100, reflect monopolistic markup on marginal cost in percent. 
13 Klette (1999), on which Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006) build, emphasizes that estimators obtained using his method are 
relatively low with respect to alternative methods of markup estimation. Moreover, estimators obtained in this study may be 
treated as short-run estimates, while those obtained in the study by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006), as long-run estimators. 
14  In the study by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006) a negative markup estimate was obtained for the same sector. It may result 
from a relatively high heterogeneity of this sector. Detailed results presented in annex B show a very low markup estimate in 
2001, which has a major effect on the average presented here. This sector will be excluded from further analysis (see section 
3.3). 
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Table 1 Summary of the results of monopolistic margins estimation 
Name NACE Margin Volatility 
ratio 
  average st. dev. S(X)/E(X) 
Manufacturing  D 0.091 0.075 0.828 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 15 0.224 0.125 0.560 
Manufacture of tobacco products  16 0.158 0.092 0.586 
Manufacture of textiles  17 0.108 0.023 0.213 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 18 0.054 0.083 1.526 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear  
19 0.071 0.058 0.814 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
20 0.185 0.047 0.253 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  21 0.182 0.083 0.455 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 0.213 0.042 0.198 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
23 0.062 0.104 1.680 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 24 0.130 0.019 0.143 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  25 0.165 0.020 0.123 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 26 0.244 0.036 0.147 
Manufacture of basic metals 27 0.054 0.060 1.115 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment  
28 0.167 0.030 0.179 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 0.073 0.079 1.078 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 30 0.009 0.119 12.893 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31 0.146 0.057 0.394 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
32 0.046 0.057 1.245 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks  
33 0.268 0.132 0.494 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 0.060 0.030 0.505 
Manufacture of other transport equipment  35 -0.092 0.237 -2.579 
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 36 0.086 0.042 0.493 
Recycling 37 0.112 0.110 0.981 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods 
G 0.033 0.015 0.444 
Hotels and restaurants  H 0.089 0.123 1.384 
Transport, storage and communication I 0.322 0.108 0.336 
Real estate, renting and business activities K 0.223 0.175 0.786 
 
Similarly to the study by Gradzewicz and Hagemejer (2006), relatively low markup 
estimators for section G (wholesale and retail trade and repair) have been obtained. 
For all other sections of market services (in particular transport and real estate and 
business activities), the estimators obtained are relatively high (in particular, higher 
than for manufacturing). 
Sectoral differentiation of margin volatility in time is relatively high. Looking at the 
ratios of markup volatility, authors assumed that sectors where margins deviate from 
the mean by less than 50% are quite stable, while those where volatility ratio exceeds 
1.5 are very volatile. In the majority of manufacturing sectors (11 cases) we can 
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observe a relative stability of markups changes over time. In four sectors 
(manufacture of textile, coke, petroleum refining, office machinery and computers 
and other transport equipment) one can observe high markup volatility, which 
suggests that the results of further analyses for those sections may carry substantial 
error. In the case of services, markup volatility is relatively low (in particular in trade, 
transport and communication) and, excluding hotels and restaurants, lower than for 
overall manufacturing industry. 
3.3 The influence of competition and business cycle on the 
level of markups 
This section analyses the relationship between the level of competition in a given 
sector and the level of monopolistic markups. Moreover, the connection between 
export intensity and pricing strategy of firms will be analyzed. Furthermore, the 
behaviour of monopolistic markup within a business cycle, both macroeconomic and 
sector-specific, will be investigated. 
The following research hypotheses have been formulated: 
1. Higher values of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, reflecting a lower number of 
hypothetical symmetric enterprises competing within a branch, result in a higher 
level of monopolistic markups. The choice of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, 
and not the number of enterprises, is dictated by the authors’ conviction that 
there is a nonlinear relation between the number of enterprises and the level of 
margins – the higher the number of enterprises, the smaller the influence of entry 
of an additional enterprise on the margins. Also, due to asymmetry of firms, firm 
number may overestimate the level of competition within an industry.  
2. Higher level of import penetration, reflecting stronger foreign competition in the 
domestic market, results in lower monopolistic markups. 
3. Firm participation in export markets results in a higher level of markups on  
products sold in the domestic market. It may result from a higher demand 
elasticity in the domestic market than in foreign markets, due to their higher 
competitiveness. An enterprise entering a foreign market can also apply 
diversified price policy, cross-subsidizing foreign sales with higher incomes from 
domestic sales15. Moreover, as theoretic models of international trade indicate 
                                                   
15 This argument may be particularly significant in the case of the Polish economy, which still experiences an increase of the role 
played by international trade.. 
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(Melitz, 2003), exporting enterprises are more effective than other domestic 
enterprises, hence they achieve lower marginal cost, which – given the fixed sale 
prices in the domestic market – allows them to set higher markups. 
4. There is connection between the level of monopolistic margins and business cycle. 
As it was mentioned before (see chapter 1), theoretical and empirical literature 
gives contradictory conclusions on the character of this relation. 
Table 2 shows the regression results, where the level of monopolistic markup in a 
given sector and time period (see the discussion in chapter 3.2) is the dependent 
variable. Independent variables are: export intensity (defined as the relation of export 
value to production value), import penetration (measured as the share of import in 
total supply of goods into the domestic market), concentration measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index and various definitions of business cycle based on 
percent deviations of the value added from the trend, calculated by the HP filter or 
log linear filter. The analyzed sample covers the period of 1997-2004 and includes all 
branches of manufacturing except for waste processing (for which data concerning 
trade were unavailable). Fixed effects panel estimation was performed. Such choice of 
specification was made on the basis of the Hausman test (the statistics are given in 
the table 2).  
The first column corresponds to the model with only internal and external 
competitiveness variables included.  This model was estimated on a full sample of 
manufacturing firms. Parameter estimates of the model are insignificant (although 
their signs are as expected), and the overall fit of the model measured by the R2 ratio 
is very poor. The relatively weak performance of the first specification considered is 
mainly due to the fact that the markup estimators in some sectors seem to be highly 
volatile (see Table 1). 
Subsequent models are estimated on a sample including only those sectors, in which 
markups do not change radically over time. Similarly, as in section 3.2, the group of 
branches with very volatile markups was defined as the branches where standard 
deviation of margins amounts to over 150% of the mean markup. Tobacco sector was 
also removed from the sample, due to the fact that the method of including excise tax 
(by either increasing costs or reducing revenues) influences considerably the 
estimated level of markups. 
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Table 2 Estimations results 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.116 0.441 0.123 0.386 0.44 0.17 7 0.184 0.292 0.300
[0.99] [3.14]*** [1.87]* [2.70]*** [3.14]*** [1.17] [1.22] [2.03]** [2.09]**
-0.155 -0.7 17 -0.592 -0.667 -0.405 -0.411 -0.502 -0.509
[1.28] [3.18]*** [2.52]** [2.88]*** [1.73]* [1.76]* [2.18]** [2.21]**
-0.297
[2.92]***
Concentration 0.104 0.816 0.686 0.806 0.812 0.67 7 0.680 0.689 0.694
[0.63] [3.29]*** [2.92]*** [3.28]*** [3.28]*** [2.82]*** [2.84]*** [2.84]*** [2.86]***
0.07 5 0.127 0.125
[1.71]* [2.82]*** [2.79]***
0.043 0.097 0.094
[0.94] [2.04]** [2.00]**
Macro cy cle [GDP- HP] -1 .306
[3.23]***
Macro cy cle [v . added - HP] -1.363
[3.20]***
Macro cy cle [GDP - linear] -1 .230
[3.08]***
Macro cy cle [v . added - linear] -1 .271
[3.02]***
Constant 0.123 0.158 0.147 0.128 0.139 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.147
[3.18]*** [3.19]*** [3.00]*** [2.45]** [2.60]** [2.94]*** [2.92]*** [2.86]*** [2.84]***
Observations 17 6 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
No of sectors 22 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Hausmann test 18.11*** 29.7 4*** 26.7 8*** 28.89*** 28.96*** 11 .95** 12.38** 16.53*** 17 .13***
R-squared 0.010 0.110 0.100 0.130 0.120 0.210 0.200 0.190 0.180
Absolute t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%
1 - all observations, 2-9 - observations where E(X)/S(X) < 1 .5
Sectoral cy cle (linear)
Export intensity  [X/Q]
Import penetration 
[M/(Q-X+M)]
Import penetration 
[M/Q]
Sectoral cy cle [HP]
 
Model 2 is built almost identically as model 1, with the sole exception that it is 
estimated on a reduced number of branches. Elimination of extreme observations 
results in a considerable improvement of the fit of the model – the R2  rises to 11%. 
Furthermore, estimators related to competitiveness are significantly different from 
zero and considerably higher (in absolute value) in relation to specification 1. 
Estimators have expected signs. Estimate of the export intensity coefficient indicates 
that an increase in exports relative to production by 1 percentage point is 
accompanied by an increase in markup by 0.4 percentage point. In turn, an increase 
of import penetraton by 1 percentage point results in a decrease of markups by 0.7 
percentage point. Higher (in absolute value) elasticity of markups with respect to 
import than to export (in all the analyzed models) shows a relationship between the 
level of markups and the advancement of processes of opening of the economy. That 
is, even growth of both exports and imports results in the lowering of the margins of 
domestic producers. 
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The influence of the number of firms operating in an industry on the level of markups 
is nonlinear and depends on the original number of firms operating in a sector. The 
estimated coefficient on concentration variable implies,  that increasing the number 
of symmetric firms for instance from 2 to 3 results in a decrease of markup by 13.6 
percentage points, but an increase in the number of enterprises from 10 to 11 results 
in a decrease of margin by 0.7 percentage point, while an increase in the number of 
enterprises from 100 to 101 results in a negligible decrease of markups16.  
Model 3 investigates the sensitivity of estimation results with respect to changes in 
the definition of import penetration. Definition of import penetration was changed to 
the ratio of imports to the volume of production instead of total supply to domestic 
market. This caused a decrease of the significance level of the estimate of the 
coefficient related to export intensity. Estimate of the concentration coefficient 
decreased slightly, and the estimated influence of import penetration on the markup 
level fell considerably. The latter effect is caused by a lower average level of import 
penetration calculated using the standard method (model 1 and 2) than in the case of 
penetration ratio calculated using the alternative method. 
As a result, estimates related to concentration ratio and import penetration 
decreased. Besides the sole effect of the change in value of average import 
penetration17, such drop in the obtained estimates is due to the correlation between 
concentration ratio and import penetration. This correlation varies from 0.1 for the 
definition used in model 2 to 0.5 in the case of the alternative specification used in 
model 3. 
In model 4, the standard definition of import penetration was restored and 
additionally a variable measuring business cycle on the sectoral level was included. It 
was calculated as a deviation of the value added in a sector from its trend calculated 
using the HP filter. In comparison to specification 2, the R2 ratio increased slightly, 
and the estimates of coefficients related to the competitiveness level did not change 
significantly. Nevertheless, the relationship of the markup level with the sectoral 
business cycle is very weak and statistically insignificant (with the standard, 95% 
level of significance). A change of the definition of sectoral business cycle (by 
calculating the trend estimator  using a log-linear filter – model 5) does not influence 
                                                   
16 This relation is falling also in the case of percent change of the number of firms. In the case of an increase of the number of 
enterprises from 10 by 10% the decrease of markups amounts to 0.74 percentage points, and when the number of firms  equals 
100, only 0.07 percentage points. 
17 A change in definition of import penetration leads to an increase in average value of this measure. 
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the results considerably, and still, the estimate of the coefficient related to the cycle is 
statistically insignificant. 
In model 6, assuming existence of both sectoral and macroeconomic cycle (similarly 
as in Boulhol, 2004) a measure of aggregate business cycle (calculated as percent 
deviation of GDP volume from its trend calculated using the HP filter) was 
introduced, along with the sectoral cycle based on the HP trend. Correlation 
coefficients between macroeconomic and sectoral cycle presented in table 3 further in 
the text show that there is a strong relationship between these two notions for 
aggregated industries, while for narrowly defined sectors of manufacturing, this 
relationship is less clear-cut or non-existent18. The overall fit of the model has 
improved considerably, as a result of introduction of macroeconomic cycle. Export 
intensity estimate decreased in comparison to the previous specifications and turned 
out to be statistically insignificant. Similarly, the strength of import penetration’s 
influence on markups and its statistical significance fell (it becomes significant at the 
10 percent level). Both of these effects are probably resulting from the correlation 
between aggregate business cycle and import penetration together with export 
intensity (respective partial regressions indicate a significant correlation between the 
two variables)19. The estimate of the concentration coefficient remains statistically 
significant and does not change considerably in comparison to previous 
specifications. Both estimates of business cycle coefficients are statistically 
significant, they differ, however, in signs and in size. Results of model 6 estimation 
suggest that markups are countercyclical with respect to aggregate business cycle and 
procyclical with respect to the sectoral cycles. Reaction of markups to aggregate cycle 
is stronger by an order of magnitude. This is related to larger cyclical fluctuations of 
production within a sector than in the cycle measured at the level of national 
economy (standard deviation of the cycle measured at sectoral level is higher than 
respective deviations at the aggregate level in all analyzed branches). Furthermore, 
other sectors of the national economy create intermediate demand for products of a 
given branch, which may contribute to a stronger reaction of profit margins to 
macroeconomic cycle. 
                                                   
18 Authors assume that the overall cyclicality of markups is a combination of sectoral and macroeconomic cyclicality. The 
sensitivity of the results with respect to the particular method of calculation of the cycle is presented later. 
19 Elimination of import penetration from the regression equation considerably weakens the fit of the model, which is an 
argument to leave that variable in the model,  although it has only limited statistical significance. 
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As part of the sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of a definition of 
macroecononomic cycle, model 7 was estimated, where macroeconomic cycle was 
based on the volume of value added instead of GDP. Change in the definition of the 
cycle has turned out to have no significant impact on parameter estimates. In models 
8 and 9, the cycle was calculated using log-linear trend for respectively value added 
and GDP. Estimates of the cycle parameters are slightly lower than in model 7, which 
results probably from a slightly larger variation of the cycle based on log-linear trend 
(than that based on HP trend).  Estimates of import penetration and export intensity 
coefficients change as well, their size is close to that of model 4 and 5. Comparing to 
model 7, the fit of the regression equation drops slightly. 
Why is the relation between markups and the business cycle positive in the case of 
sectoral cycle and negative in the case of macroeconomic cycle? One of the possible 
explanations of this phenomenon is that the adjustment of firms to macroeconomic 
and sectoral disturbances is different. Let us consider a case of a positive demand 
shock affecting only producers in a given sector, with the level of aggregate demand 
and average prices unchanged. If firms face a downward-sloping demand curve, the 
positive sectoral demand shock results in an upward shift of the demand curve, 
increase in supply and increase in prices (relative demand changes, which causes a 
change in relative prices20). Increase in prices may be higher than the increase in 
costs (inducing an increase of markups) due to constant wages and capital costs in 
the economy as a whole, which hinders the growth of marginal costs in a given sector 
(growth of sectoral wages is also limited by reallocation of factors to the branch, 
where demand shock took place). Positive sectoral supply shock (the growth of 
efficiency of production in a given sector) results in shifting marginal costs curves 
downwards, which, given unchanged aggregated demand and prices, causes an 
increase of monopolist markups in short run. Thus, sectoral shocks may result in 
procyclical behaviour of monopolist margins in short term, under the assumption 
that there is price rigidity. On the contrary, an aggregate demand shock leads to an 
increase in wages and capital costs that is more than proportional to the growth of 
prices, as a result of limited availability of production factors in the short run. 
Limited resources cause a relatively high increase of marginal costs (due to more 
intense adjustments of production factors along the intensive margins: overtime pay 
and increase of capital utilization costs together with higher intensity of capital 
                                                   
20 In the analysis of effects of sectoral shocks it is assumed that the sector is small when compared to the rest of the economy. 
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utilization and increased depreciation) inducing countercyclical variations in 
markups. This interpretation of markup variation heavily relies on the existence of 
price rigidities. These may result from oligopolistic mechanisms or high menu costs, 
which lead to relatively low frequency of price changes (see e.g. Atkinson and others, 
2006). Arguments proving that countercyclicality of margins exists at the aggregated 
levels can be found, among others, in the study of Woodford and Rottemberg (1999). 
Moreover, this assumption is often adopted when building macroeconomic models, 
which take into consideration monopolist competition in the goods market and real 
and nominal rigidities (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans, 2005 and Comin and 
Gertler, 2006). 
Table 2 Correlation of margins and business cycles 
Industry EKD HP Filter
Manufacturing D -0.07 8 -0.334 * 0.7 32 -0.635
Food products and beverages 15 -0.212 -0.210 0.665 -0.434
Tobacco products 16 -0.182 -0.241 -0.47 9 -0.067
Textiles 17 -0.640 -0.7 11 0.199 -0.7 39
Wearing apparel and furs 18 -0.291 -0.17 1 0.57 0 0.339
Leather and leather products 19 0.814 0.7 37 0.211 0.395
Wood and wood products 20 0.065 -0.059 0.436 0.007
Pulp, paper and paper products 21 -0.015 -0.553 * 0.67 3 -0.7 7 8
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 0.429 0.420 0.7 82 0.330
Coke and refined petroleum products 23 0.37 8 0.147 * -0.046 0.010
Chemicals and chemical products 24 0.07 9 -0.266 0.57 2 -0.636
Rubber and plastic products 25 0.151 -0.47 6 * 0.689 -0.17 5
Other non-metalic mineral products 26 0.497 0.383 -0.648 0.400
Basic metals 27 0.369 0.186 * 0.545 -0.240
Metal products 28 0.584 0.07 5 * -0.158 -0.137
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 -0.069 -0.137 0.182 -0.116
Office machinery and computers 30 -0.7 33 -0.7 82 0.649 -0.480
Electrical machinery and apparatus 31 0.616 0.57 9 0.448 -0.128
Radio, television and communication equipment 32 -0.267 -0.07 6 0.611 0.544
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 0.367 0.396 0.87 5 0.480
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 0.537 0.100 * -0.285 -0.7 88
Other transport equipment 35 0.210 0.182 0.7 7 5 -0.468
Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 36 -0.067 -0.145 0.325 0.056
Recy cling 37 -0.122 -0.388 * 0.507 -0.27 9
T rade and repair G -0.336 -0.495 0.653 -0.298
Hotels and restaurants H -0.286 -0.399 * 0.7 27 -0.550
T ransport, storage and com m unications I -0.349 -0.622 0.122 -0.107
Business and real estate services K -0.358 -0.244 * -0.395 -0.57 3
* branches in which cy clicality  of margins cannot be unam biguously  determ ined on the basis of the cy cle definition
Correlation of the 
margins with the 
cy cle
Correlation of  
the sectoral 
cy cle with the 
macroeconomic 
cy cle
Correlation 
of the 
margins with 
the cy cle
Log-lin. Filter
 
The different character of the relation between markups and business cycle seems to 
be confirmed to a large extent by the results of correlation analysis between phases of 
the cycle and margins in particular sectors. Negative correlation between 
macroeconomic cycle and markups seems to prevail (negative correlation was 
observed in 15 of the 27 analyzed sectors, and also in the manufacturing aggregate, 
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while positive correlation was observed only in 2 sectors), but the relation between 
markups and sectoral cycle is very diversified. Procyclicality of sectoral markups 
seem to be more common than antyclicality21. In the remaining branches there is no 
clear correlation between the sectoral cycle and monopolist margins. It must be noted 
here that in some sectors, where there is positive correlation between the sectoral 
cycle and the macroeconomic cycle (e.g. food, clothes, manufacture of office 
equipment), the correlation between margins and the sectoral business cycle is 
negative or non-existent. It also seems to indicate that the correlation of margins with 
the macroeconomic cycle is stronger than with the sectoral cycle. By contrast, in some 
sectors (e.g. manufacture of leather, coke, non-metallic and metal products) there is a 
weak correlation between the sectoral cycle and the macroeconomic cycle, which can 
partially explain positive correlations between the sectoral cycle and the margins. 
 
Summary 
The aim of this study is an estimation of short-run monopolistic markups in the 
Polish economy and an assessment of their relationship with the degree of 
competition, both internal and external. In addition, the behaviour of markups along 
the business cycle was analyzed.  
Methodology employed is based on widely cited work by Roeger (1995), where the 
level of margins in the American economy is estimated in an unbiased manner. This 
methodology, designed to estimate sectoral markups using time series data, if applied 
to firm-level data, allows for estimation of time-varying sectoral markup estimates. 
Using Roeger’s model, the authors managed to obtain information on the behaviour 
of markups in all manufacturing and selected service sectors within the period of 
1997-2004. Time span of analyzed markup estimates correspond approximately to 
the length of one business cycle and it allows authors to examine the volatility of 
monopolistic margins within the cycle, however, one has to bear in mind that 
extending inference on future behaviour of markups and making long-run 
conclusions is rather problematic. 
Results suggest that there are considerable markups in many sectors of the Polish 
economy. The overall level of markups is, to a large extent, in line with the previous 
                                                   
21 In this very short time serie, it impossible to say anything about statistical significance of correlation, since the minimal 
significant level of correlation (with the 95% confidence) amounts to roughly 70%. 
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study by the same authors that focused on the issue of long-term monopolistic 
margins and returns to scale. Stability of obtained estimates in time is satisfactory in 
most sectors (only in 4 sectors the volatility of margins was very high, and in those 
sectors the estimates are of little relevance and usefulness). In most of other cases, 
however, the overall fit of the markup estimation equations was satisfactory. 
According to the obtained panel estimates, competition is an important factor 
affecting the level of markups. It applies both to the internal competition, measured 
by the market concentration, and the foreign competition, measured by the import 
penetration ratios. An increase in import penetration by 1 percentage point results in 
a decrease in markups by approximately 0.7 percentage point. The postulated 
relationship between the number of companies and the margins is non-linear – the 
increase in the number of companies from 2 to 3 results in the decrease in markups 
by approximately 13.6 pp, while an increase in the number of firms from 10 to 11 
causes a decrease in margins by approximately 0.7 pp. These figures vary slightly 
depending on the specification of the regression equation. 
The negative correlation between margins and the macroeconomic cycle found in the 
Polish data seem to confirm the conclusions from many theoretical models. The 
correlation is observable on the level of the economy as a whole and in most of 
individual sectors. The results also point to a positive but less clear correlation 
between the sectoral cycle and the level of markups. The differences may result from 
a different nature of adjustments of businesses in reaction to external shocks at the 
sectoral level and the whole economy level, as well as different shocks affecting 
individual sectors and the economy as a whole. Limited time span of data available 
does not allow to carry out an appropriate verification of such hypotheses. This is 
undoubtedly an interesting issue for further empirical studies. 
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Annex A. Derivations 
A.1 Derivations of (7) 
Applying definition (4) to equation (3) we obtain: 
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By subtracting 
K
dK
 from both sides and rearranging, we arrive at equation (7) in 
section 2: 
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 A.2 Derivations of (12) 
Applying definition (4) to equation (11) we obtain: 
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Making use of (5), applying 
P
dP
MC
dMC =  and subtracting 
K
K
w
dw
from both sides we 
obtain: 
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w
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K
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i
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i
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K
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Dividing the above equation by µ  and subtracting
P
dP
 from both sides results in: 
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Adding 
K
K
w
dw
to both sides of the equation and rearranging, we arrive at equation (12): 
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Annex B. Detailed results of monopolistic margins 
estimations 
Table 1. Volatility of monopolistic margins in time 
 NACE 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Manufacture of food products 
and beverages  
15 0.20 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.30 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.26 
(0.07) 
0.29 
(0.09) 
0.44 
(0.19) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
Manufacture of tobacco 
products 
16 0.12 
(0.04) 
0.30 
(0.03) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
Manufacture of textiles 17 0.10 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 
18 -0.14 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.12 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
Manufacture of leather and 
leather products 
19 0.12 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
Manufacture of wood and 
wood products 
20 0.22 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.21 
(0.06) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.01) 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products  
21 0.15 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.01) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
Publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded 
media  
22 0.24 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.05) 
0.27 
(0.05) 
0.23 
(0.05) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.04) 
0.20 
(0.05) 
0.20 
(0.01) 
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
23 0.13 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.01_ 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
chemical products  
24 0.13 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.04) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.02) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products 
25 0.15 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
Manufacture of other non-
metallic mineral products 
26 0.25 
(0.03) 
0.25 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
0.23 
(0.05) 
0.26 
(0.04) 
0.25 
(0.02) 
0.27 
(0.02) 
0.28 
(0.02) 
Manufacture of basic metals  27 0.08 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery and equipment  
28 0.16 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.05) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.14 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.03) 
0.22 
(0.04) 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
29 0.11 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
Manufacture of office 
machinery and computers 
30 -0.01 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.25 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.03) 
Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  
31 0.24 
(0.04) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.02) 
Manufacture of radio, 
television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
32 -0.01 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
Manufacture of medical, 
precision and optical 
instruments, watches and 
clocks 
33 0.26 
(0.14) 
0.27 
(0.15) 
0.32 
(0.15) 
0.23 
(0.13) 
0.56 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(0.07) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 
34 0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
-0.63 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
-0.20 
(0.04) 
-0.10 
(0.01) 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
35 0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.04) 
-0.63 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.20 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c. 
36 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
Recycling 37 0.16 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
0.23 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
0.16 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.06) 
Percentage standard errors given in brackets 
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Table 4. Volatility of monopolistic margins in time (continued) 
 NACE 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Electricity, gas, steam and hot 
water supply  
40 0.39 
(0.04) 
0.38 
(0.07) 
0.36 
(0.05) 
0.47 
(0.06) 
0.23 
(0.07) 
0.37 
(0.08) 
0.21 
(0.04) 
0.25 
(0.03) 
Collection. purification and 
distribution of water  
41 0.27 
(0.01) 
0.32 
(0.03) 
0.32 
(0.01) 
0.34 
(0.04) 
0.34 
(0.01) 
0.33 
(0.04) 
0.44 
(0.03) 
0.41 
(0.02) 
Sale. maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 
50 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
Wholesale trade and 
commission trade. except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles  
51 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
Retail trade. except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of personal and 
household goods 
52 0.06 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
-0.20 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
Hotels and restaurants  55 0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
0.21 
(0.02) 
Land transport; transport via 
pipelines  
60 0.46 
(0.20) 
0.31 
(0.15) 
0.45 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
0.42 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(0.03) 
0.29 
(0.11) 
Water transport  61 -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
Supporting and auxiliary 
transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies 
63 0.63 
(0.03) 
0.26 
(0.03) 
0.50 
(0.09) 
0.54 
(0.06) 
0.44 
(0.06) 
0.32 
(0.02) 
0.42 
(0.05) 
0.35 
(0.05) 
Post and telecommunications 64 0.46 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.09) 
0.34 
(0.02) 
0.36 
(0.01) 
0.29 
(0.06) 
0.43 
(0.05) 
0.49 
(0.01) 
Real estate activities 70 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.17 
(0.04) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
Renting of machinery and 
equipment without operator 
and of personal and household 
goods 
71 0.73 
(0.19) 
0.64 
(0.11) 
0.50 
(0.13) 
0.31 
(0.09) 
0.89 
(0.01) 
0.60 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.11) 
0.25 
(0.08) 
Computer and related 
activities 
72 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.26 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.20 
(0.02) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
Other business activities 74 0.02 
(0.26) 
0.29 
(0.10) 
0.18 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.04) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
Percentage standard errors given in brackets 
 
 
 
 
